This paper analyzes diverse forms of modern neopaganism. The author provides defi nitions of paganism and neopaganism that are adjusted for the diachronic perspective. It has been argued that neopaganism as a distinct type of non-traditional religiosity that confronts traditional religions, including traditional paganism, appeared not in the 20th century. Instead, it dates back to the heyday of the world paganism in the centuries before the Current Era. The paper describes boundaries between neopaganism and its environment, including within the folk culture. It highlights the role of state programs for the revival of the folk culture and arts and crafts in the strengthening and development of neopaganism. To clarify its variable organizational boundaries, a typology of neopaganism is given according to the degree of the structural development of its variants. Its variable content specifi cs is catalogued within a classifi cation made on the basis of the analysis of pantheons features in 252 neopagan organizations. A sample of 201 groups from 22 countries shows the dynamics of the emergence of neopagan groups in the 20th and 21st centuries, peaking in the 1990s and subsequently decreasing. The impossibility of continuity between modern neopaganism and ancient paganism is examined in detail. The strategies of the work of neopagan communities against the background of the actual impossibility of establishing such continuity are revealed. The problem of the local specifi cs of neopagan communities is raised, including the infl uence of the cultural gap between the current inhabitants of countries and their predecessors who used to lived in the same territories (e.g. in the USA). The attention of neopagans to environmental problems is analyzed. The author provides examples of the variable attitude of neopagans to the Orthodox Church and illustrates the attitude of the Church to them with an extensive selection of passages from the Old and New Testaments.

The development of modern paganism in Russia as a projection of alternative religiosity, a socio-political and ideological phenomenon has been around for several decades. Arisen at the end of the 1970s as a project of a lonely passionary A. А. Dobrovolsky, it soon acquired the status of a public institution, whose various units (communities, unions and an extra-systemic community of sympathizers that are potential neophytes) constitute a cult environment. During the development of this new religious movement, several independent directions appeared (rodnoverie, Odinism, primitive paganism, Druidism, Wicca, neoshamanism, neotengrism, etc.) with appropriate festive and ritual complexes, mythologies, source bases, ministers, and sacred languages (Newspeak). Currently, we may say that a whole neopagan diasporic community has emerged, claiming to have its own system of upbringing and education, projections of a new “correct” history, and social and structural forms that are parallel to the existing state and public institutions of the Russian Federation. The proposed paper aims to consider the most important concepts of the organization and specifi cs of propaganda that contribute to the successful functioning of Russian variations of neopaganism. The researcher concludes that modern Russian paganism is a constantly updated living worldview system with a well-developed ideology and organizational structure. Its most important element is the fi gure of a charismatic ideologue, who at will constructs both the microcosm and its position among other confessions in the domestic and international arena. It is the community leader who is responsible for the diversity of organizational forms, taking into account external factors (the needs of the fl ock) when modeling the latter. The propaganda of the neopagan diaspora includes a complex of various methods and practices, using the widest range of means, such as specialized printed materials, lecture courses, research activities, opening of educational institutions, religious mimicry, active development of the media space, and international activities.

The paper investigates the problem of the national identity and modern attempts of its deconstruction. Neopaganism as a serious challenge to Russian and all-Russian identity is examined. The author believes that the main danger lies in the fact that neopagan concepts are rooted in the discourse of the national museum, cultural and educational communities. The paper provides examples of successful dissertations that, from the author’s point of view, cater for the idea of a real change of identity among Russian residents, including schoolchildren. The so-called modern Merya ethno-futurism movement is described, which promotes the abandonment of the Russian identity by the inhabitants of Central Russia and its substitution with some supposedly real traditions of the Finno-Ugric Merya tribal union. This union actually disappeared almost a thousand years ago. The author believes that modern neopagan developments are largely based on the reconstruction of Slavic paganism made by researchers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Those, in turn, relied on a number of written sources. The author proves the necessity to subject these literary monuments to new critical studies, verifying the reliability of the information about Slavic paganism contained therein. For example, he draws research conclusions on the basis of ancient Russian morals (preaching). However, these morals were compiled by the Old Russian scribes who were centuries apart from the time of the baptism of Russia, received a pro-Greek education in a monastic environment and strictly adhered to Byzantine rhetorical patterns. One example is the well-known Word (Slovo) about Idols. As a result, these morals, from the author’s point of view, cannot give a real picture of Slavic paganism. The author shows the reasons for the emergence of false pseudo-historical literary myths about Slavic paganism in the Laurentian Codex and the Legend of the Construction of the City of Yaroslavl. He believes that the modern neopagan identity, actively planted not only by marginals, but also by representatives of the cultural and educational community, relies in reality on literary myths generated by carriers of the non-Russian identity of the past.

In medieval Russia and even later on, being Russian meant being an Orthodox Christian. And yet, neopaganism nowadays tries to promote the image of a truly Russian person as a non-Orthodox believer. It therefore seems interesting to compare the spiritual path of neoprotestants and neopagans, as equally seeking to remove believers from the Orthodox Church and off er alternative perspectives for their spiritual life. In both cases, the correlation between the need for the rejection of believers from the dominant Church and the cultivation of the sin of pride in them (the position of their personal preferences and the constant construction of a convincing picture of the world as the standard of correct faith) will serve as a working hypothesis of the study. In that case, neoprotestantism and neopaganism are both the forms of the overproud exaltation of the narrow human mind over the truth once given by God and kept by the Church. The fundamental position of personal preferences and the constant construction of a convincing picture of the world as the standard of correct faith is the practical realization of this idea. For neoprotestants, their personal freedom holds an absolute priority over the tradition. Therefore, belonging to a particular community takes as little importance for them as it does for neopagans. At the same time, neopaganism culturologically represents an example of the transition from modernity to postmodernity, being an example of placing faith in any concepts, even obviously artifi cial, eclectic or recently invented ones. Based on the evidence of St. John of the Ladder and St. Luke (Voino-Yasenetsky), it is shown in the article that being in heresy or unorthodoxy indicates the theological ignorance and the unstable position of its adherents. This, in turn, gives rise to lies and other passions, examples of which are listed in the article. Neoprotestants and neopagans can be also united in their fundamental anti-historicism and the humiliation of the Holy Spirit. Ultimately, they are all forced to constantly supplement and construct their own faith, starting from some generally accepted principles. The current trends in the doctrines of neoprotestants and neopagans are therefore often based on the agreement with the “spirit of the times” and the authority of the public opinion.

The paper deals with the understanding of a group of modern philosophical and ideological concepts and beliefs that arose around the idea of the Planet as a kind of independent superorganism, capable of reasonable self-regulation in order to maintain life in all its diversity, as a single religious phenomenon, which the author proposes to call planetarism. The author places environmentalism, animal rights activism, and movements in defense of the rights of sexual and other minorities under a single defi nition of planetarism, characterized by him as a new green religion. All the components of the new religion are being developed under the slogan of saving the Planet that is a single source and a common home for all forms and manifestations of life. From this point of view, everything that is around is born by the Planet, and everything that is born by it has the right to exist. The author off ers a basis for comparative analysis of religious teachings, defi ning it as a universal structure of religions. Comparing planetarism with the structure and character of modern theistic and nontheistic world religions that have had the greatest impact on the development of European countries, the author proves that planetarism corresponds to the concept of religion and speaks about its peacefulness. At the same time, the development and aggressive dissemination of its values and ethical attitudes lead to a prominent reaction from adherents of traditional religions, provoking civil and international confl icts. The author concludes that it is necessary to recognize the religious nature of planetarism, primarily to protect the traditional values of Christianity and to form a dialogue between the church and society. 

 The article considers the philosophical and culturological prerequisites for the emergence of neopaganism in Western Europe at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. It consistently outlines the history of neopaganism starting with the Renaissance, when the images of pagan gods became the pictorial embodiment of advanced humanistic ideas. Devoid of religious content as yet, they were already familiar to the educated people of Western Europe. The age of Enlightenment saw the myth of the Dark Ages being developed and popularized, directly linked with Christianity and Christian culture by Enlightenment philosophers in their works. At the same time, the image of a “noble savage” as an incarnate holder of virtues, Christian by nature, and yet emphatically deprived of the Christian religion and upbringing, was developing in literature. In the 19th century this was superimposed by the evolutionist theory of the emergence of religions, from the standpoint of which Christianity became only one of the forms that satisfi ed basic and universal human needs. A signifi cant contribution was also made by the concept of primordialism, which considered the people as a kind of ethnocultural historical constant. Within this approach, Christianity could be discarded without any signifi cant loss for culture, as values and virtues would not suff er from this, and the people would still comprise the same ethnocultural unity. Such ideas became the philosophical and culturological basis for the emergence of neopaganism. The upheavals of the twentieth century created the impetus for the emergence of the fi rst neopagan organizations. Many contemporaries considered world wars, the spreading urbanization and globalization as the inevitable consequence of the Christian-type development. The idea of returning to paganism became an attractive alternative for the part of the Western European society that was burdened by the processes of the twentieth century, The article also considers the origin and the emergence of neopaganism in Russia. It could be characterized by the same philosophical and cultural prerequisites as the one in Western Europe, but emerged with a certain historical lag. In addition, the Russian neopaganism had the ideological background of the communist propaganda as its important and striking distinguishing feature. The Christian images and meanings of the Russian traditional culture were either hushed up or openly replaced by pagan ones, as more suitable for the tasks of building a bright communist future. The knowledge of the described historical prerequisites will allow one to better understand both neopaganism itself and many related phenomena of the modern times.

This article examines the phenomenon of neo-paganism, which manifested itself during the socio-political confl ict in Ukraine in 2014. Neo-paganism is a heterogeneous and dynamic phenomenon that takes many forms in interaction with right-wing radical and extremist organizations. Its inherent opposition to universalist religions and, accordingly, to the established social order would lead to the exploitation of neo-pagan ideas and symbols in protests and violent actions by right-wing radical organizations. The legitimization of violence in such organizations was based precisely on romanticized images of pagans represented as fearless and ruthless fi ghters. We also present a classifi cation of neo-pagan organizations operating on the territory of Ukraine in 2014–2022. This classifi cation assumes the division of neo-pagan organizations into groups based on the cultural layer reproduced by them, i.e. Slavic pre-Christian culture, ancient “knowledge” of the Cossacks, Western European forms of paganism and neo-pagan ideological choices (musicians, poets, etc.). Forms of interaction between right-wing radical organizations and neo-pagans during the Euromaidan and in the subsequent so-called anti-terrorist operation are also investigated. Examples of the participation of neopagans in political actions and cult practices adopted by them during Euromaidan are provided. The number of persons who consider themselves to be neo-pagans increased in 2000, 2013, 2018 and 2021. The peak of the development of neo-paganism falls on 2021, when the percentage of neo-pagans amounted to 0.2 per cent for the fi rst time. Ukrainian statistical studies see an infl ux of young people aged 18–29 years to these groups. We touch upon the problem of changes in neo-pagan ideas during the socio-political confl ict in Ukraine and their integration into nationalist and neoNazi rhetoric. The factors that caused the popularity, social recognition and attractiveness of neo-paganism in diff erent social groups of Ukraine in 2021 are outlined. The most recognizable Ukrainian organization exploiting neo-pagan practices, ideas, and symbols is the Azov Regiment (recognized by the court as a terrorist organization and banned on the territory of the Russian Federation).

The historical approach to the formation of the origin concept for the Old Russian state and the ethno-cultural history of the Russian people allows for fervent discussions. They can be resolved by a culturological approach and the understanding of the cultureforming role of Orthodoxy as a key factor in the formation, preservation and transmission of the folk tradition through many centuries. Since the very emergence of the Russian land, the Orthodox tradition has been preserving the continuous transmission of values, worldview, and attitudes to many phenomena of the cultural life of the Russian population. However, after Peter the Great, and even more after the Soviet period marked by controlled destruction and substitution of the tradition, one can talk about the crisis of the Russian identity and the search for the living tradition and its place in contemporary life. In modern Russia, three approaches to the replication of the folk tradition can be observed. The fi rst one is conditioned by the activity of cultural institutions and dates back to the Soviet period of the Russian tradition destruction and the formation of the new Soviet people’s identity. The second one is implemented through the activity of the youth folklore movement of “practicing folklorists” who are guided by the materials of folklorist and ethnographic research and fi eld data. The third one is represented by an alternative identity formed through the practices of neo-pagan associations and the activity of organizers of holidays, festivities, and seminars who share this worldview. The latter approach is characterized by the rejection of the Christian bases and content of folk festivals that have survived till present in the research data. Maslenitsa and Kupala have always been Christian holidays and have been perceived as such among those with a Christian worldview. However, representatives of the third approach deny this, going to obvious falsifi cations and forgeries. Their worldview leads not only to the distortion of the value bases of Russian ethno-cultural tradition, but also to an anti-state ideology.

Since the emergence of the phenomenon of the Soviet (later Russian) new paganism, the ideologists of the movement set out to develop their own political programs, consisting of utopian projections aimed at the functioning of nativist religious groups in the reality of a hostile/neutral environment. These plans listed as their ultimate goals the raising of paganism to the level of the state ideology and even the complete reorganization of the Russian Federation into a new theocratic state headed by a formal cast of cult worshippers: magi and sacrifi cers. The purpose of this article is to examine the central political concepts of the leaders of the Russian pagan movement of the last third of the 20th — fi rst third of the 21st centuries. The experience of Dobroslav (A. A. Dobrovolsky), who laid the foundations of this worldview for decades to come, is taken as a biographical example of the pagan political development. Dobroslav’s concept received its further development, and underwent the transformation in the course of the quest of magus Velimir (N. N. Speransky) and subsequent ideologists of the Russian religious nativism. As a result of the research, the author of the article arrives at the conclusion about the continuity of the neo-pagan political doctrine and the constancy of the central strata. Those include the organization of “their own” space in the form of self-governing (veche) communities, independent of the “outside world” and aimed at the gradually expanding infl uence up to the complete seizure of power. This can be achieved either through the strengthening and development of diasporic pagan groups (a “peaceful” evolutionary option), or through the violent overthrow of an existing state institution (a “military” coup). Other goals include creating an ethnic hierarchical system subordinate to theocratic leaders as pagan leaders of the nation and strengthening contacts with representatives of the indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation, carriers of pre-Abrahamic beliefs and with “co-religionists” from abroad. In terms of the worldview, we can see a signifi cant infl uence of eschatological views and conspiracy theories; rejection of the off icial science, political and economic systems and reliance on the author’s constructs of community leaders and individual ideologists of the neo-pagan community. It should be noted that this “set” of neopagan constants is subject to modernization taking into account the current (topical) trends in the development of the political system in Russia and the world as a whole.

The paper investigates the participation of neo-pagans in the political life of post-Soviet Russia. Until now, such studies have mostly focused on the rituals and mythology of neo-pagan practices and the study of their sacred books and artifacts. According to the author, contrary to stereotypes about the escapism of neopagans, the analysis shows that neo-pagan organizations are very active. Neo-pagan organizations are characterized by their focus on infi ltration into the parties and organizations, either leftist (the Russian Communist Workers’ Party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Russky Lad, created in 2012 within this party) nationalist (the National Power Party of Russia (NDPR), the Russian All-People’s Union (ROS), the National Democratic Party of Russia), ultra-liberal (PARNAS, Navalny Headquarters) or ecological (Union of Greens of Russia). There are a number of cases when the leaders of regional branches of political parties simultaneously performed the functions of priests of pagan cults. For example, the head of the Russian Bloc – Saratov movement Pavel Galaktionov or the secretary of the Kirov district Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in Saratov Vladimir Maslov, who in 2014–2017 lobbied for the construction of a neo-pagan temple in the center of Saratov. In 2002, the same claim was addressed by the capital’s neo-pagans to the Moscow authorities under the slogan, “Let there be a shrine on Poklonnaya Hill!” In addition, the paper reveals the infl uence of neo-pagan fi gures on the right-wing youth, provides extensive evidence on this subject, and examines the attitude of neo-pagans (both ideologists and their ordinary followers) to Christianity.