Lev Aleksandrovich  Tikhomirov, a  revolutionary,  and later a major conservative  notionalist and public figure, had done a lot to defend the interests of Orthodoxy in Russia and to protect it. The article examines  this direction of Tikhomirov’s literary and journalistic heritage in connection with his biography. Unlike most politicians of the  conservative camp,  Tikhomirov started analyzing Russia’s policy in the newly annexed territories  (the  Western Caucasus, Central Asia and the Ussuri Region) with the focus on the religious component of this issue as early as the first years after his return to Russia from emigration. He argued the point that the geopolitical consolidation of the  Russian Empire on the  national outskirts  was impossible without  strengthening its socio-cultural and, first of all, religious influence there.  Later, he concentrated on the fight against  V.S. Solovyov, V.V. Rozanov and especially L.N. Tolstoy’s “religious intellectualizing”, which had strayed  far from true Orthodoxy. The ideas he expressed in these  discussions had laid the  foundation for his theory  of the  monarchical  state-hood. Relying on the historical experience of the country’s development, Tikhomirov noted  In his fundamental  study “Monarchical Statehood” (1905), that  Russia was  a country  with particularly favorable  conditions  for the  formation  of a monarchical form of government. Among the conditions necessary to develop an ideal type of monarchy, Tikhomirov gave the first place to the religious principle. The article also draws  attention to his publicistic work in 1905-1908 and considers the projects he proposed for the transformation  of relations  between the  church and the  state. Here, the period of his work as an editor and publisher of the Moscow Vedomosti newspaper from 1909 to 1913 stands out from the rest. At that time, the newspaper used to pay a great amount  of attention to the analysis of the church policy of the country and to very harsh criticizing of the religious legislation discussed from the rostrum of the State  Duma. After his retirement at the end of 1913, Tikhomirov had settled in Sergiev Posad, where he worked on his historiosophical  work “Religious and  Philosophical Foundations of History”. Tikhomirov finished his earthly journey in 1923 and was buried in Sergiev Posad. At present,  his intellectual legacy concerning the  organization  of the  church and state policy and the  role of the Russian Orthodox  Church in the life of the Russian society is a focus of interest and demand.

The  article  analyzes  the  political beliefs  of  the  Holy Righteous  John  of Kronstadt.  It is noted that  to  the  end  of his days he remained  a convinced  monarchist, a supporter of autocracy and an opponent of revolutionary ideas, defending the purity of the  Orthodox faith and opposing  the  penetration of Catholic, Protestant, liberal and  Masonic  ideas  into  the  church.  John  of Kronstadt supported by word and deed various rightist monarchical (blackhundredist)  organizations, both official (parties, unions, societies) and unofficial (circles, salons, including the salons of General Evgeny Bogdanovich and Countess  Sophia Ignatieva). He also allocated  money for the development of the largest Black Hundred organization, the Union of the Russian People, and other right-wing associations, joined the Union himself and expressed support for various Black Hundred initiatives by telegrams and letters.

The article studies  some  of his public speeches, sermons, articles and diary entries. In his public speeches, Saint John of Kronstadt repeatedly pointed out that the death of the Russian monarchy would inevitably lead to the most negative consequences for Russia, up to its collapse. Special attention is paid to the attitude of the clergyman to the imperial power and the royal ministry, as he supported the  idea of the  divine origin of the  royal power.  Like many other conservatives, Saint John of Kronstadt considered the Holy Blessed Grand Duke Alexander Nevsky a kind of ideal monarch, pointing out the virtues of his rule. In his sermons, he rebuked the revolutionaries and spoke about  the danger of the revolutionary threat, pointing out that  Russia would perish if the  revolutionary  forces won. Saint John of Kronstadt explained the Russian defeat  in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 by the decrease of faith in the Russian society and the decline of patriotism.

The article notes  that the numerous  sermons  of the priest repeatedly showed  his concern about  the fate of Russia, prone to secession due to the activity of the liberal intelligentsia.

The article is based on the pre-revolutionary journalism. It reveals the attitude of Orthodox church authors of the second half of the 19th century and early 20th century to a number of subjects related  to the problems  of the Russian nationalism. The traditionally high interest of the  Russian society in general  and Orthodox Christians in particular  in the  attitude of the  Russian Orthodox Church to nationalism in its various manifestations  accounts for the relevance of the publication.  Considering the return of the modern church journalism to the same range of problems  that  concerned representatives of the Orthodox  clergy, theologians, missionaries and teachers of theological schools in the pre-revolutionary period, it would seem  that  an appeal to the historical experience of their understanding is fairly significant  and essential. The article examines the ways in which church authors used to understand the nationalism, their ideas about  its place in the life of an Orthodox Christian, along with its challenges and threats. It is noted  that although the Orthodox Church did not have a single and consistent view of the nationalism, most  church authors tried to give this phenomenon a direction  that  would  not  contradict the  gospel  teaching  and could become a constructive and creative  factor  for the  Russian life. At the same time, it is noted  that, when discussing the nationalism, church authors of the second half of the 19th century and early 20th century often gave this concept a meaning different from that of modern scientists, politicians and journalists. Standing at the Christian viewpoint, church authors  rejected the militant, “pagan”, secular kind of the nationalism that involved only the earthly prosperity of the people.  They supported another kind of nationalism consisting in the right of peoples to a special spiritual path, cultural and state  identity and independence.

The emergence of right-wing parties in Russia came as a reaction of conservative-minded segments of the population to the development of the revolutionary movement. These parties stood up for the autocracy and had played a significant role in the events of 1905–1907. The monarchist movement  united the representatives of all social classes and became the most mass political movement in Russia during the inter-revolutionary period. The blackhundredist ideology was very critical about the projects of both socialist and liberalbourgeois reconstruction of Russia. Relying on traditional political and moral (primarily Christian) values, it came up with its own version of the non-capitalist development of the country. At the same time, a prominent place in ideological constructions of the right-wing movement was given to the antisemitism, which seriously affected the political image of monarchists. After the victory over the revolution in 1905–1907, the political activity of the right-wing movement had significantly decreased, which was greatly facilitated by the government, whose interest did not include the existence of an unconventional political force seeking to restore the “pre-manifest” (absolutist) regime. The discord and squabbles in the monarchist camp, caused by the clash of personal ambitions of right-wing figures, the passive behaviour of the party masses, who saw no point in continuing the political activity after the revolutionary ‘turmoil’ had come to its end, as well as financial difficulties, had also played their role. The surge in the right-wing activity caused  by the outbreak of the First World War did not change  this trend  in general.  In February 1917, the small-numbered and scattered right-wing organizations, that had already been experiencing decline, failed to oppose the revolutionary storm and disappeared from the stage of history without a fight.

The article regards  the attitude of party ideologists and leaders of the Duma faction of All-Russian National Union (Russian nationalist party) to the problems of the Russian Orthodox Church at the  beginning  of the  20th century  and its role in the  political life of the  country.  The research  aims to  reveal the  perception of the role and place of the Russian Orthodox Church in the state life of the Russian Empire during the Third of June Monarchy period by nationally-conservative representatives of the All-Russian National Union party. The relevance  of this topic is determined both  by the  lingering ambiguity in the  perception of relation between the country and the confession by the modern society, and by a certain degree of newly emerged dominance of the conservative ideology in the political life of the country. The article considers the main problems the Russian Orthodox Church faced in the historical period in question, and the understanding of these problems and ways of solving them  by the said party. The reason  for such close attention on behalf of the party leaders  to the issues of the Church was their consideration  of the Orthodox Church primarily as one of the most  important components of the spiritual and educational foundations of the  country  and, consequently, every possible assistance  they provided to parliamentary bills in its support. At the  same  time, they did not  turn a blind eye to the negative trends that took place among a certain part of the clergy, which damaged both  the  Church itself and its reputation in the eyes of the population. Their active support,  therefore, was often accompanied by rather active criticism, when the nationalists felt that certain destructive  trends in the Church carried negative consequences for the  country.  Particular emphasis  is placed  on the lack of unity between representatives of the Duma faction and party ideologists, in particular M.O. Menshikov, on a number of issues related  to the Russian Orthodox  Church.  The attention is drawn to the peculiarity of the party: it had a significant number of active members from among  the  clergy. Most importantly,  one of the leading roles in the Duma activity of the party was played by the Bishop Evlogiy, one of the future leading church figures of emigration, who, until the end of his life, retained the desire to consolidate the Church for the sake of state  interests.

The article investigates the  Vekhi (Milestones), a collection of articles published  in 1909 by Nikolai Berdyaev, Sergei Bulgakov, Mikhail Gershenzon, Bogdan Kistyakovski, Peter Struve, Semyon  Frank and  Aleksandr Izgoev,  that  is analyzed  through the prism of the post-secularization, which became the dominant in the  Russian intellectual culture of the  early 20th century.  This phenomenon implied a rapid advancement of various forms  of religious philosophy into the  centre  of the  Russian philosophical tradition  in search  for solution to various problems  faced by the state,  society, family and education,  reflected in the articles of the Milestones authors.  The collection became  most widely known — and criticized — among  the leftist intelligentsia, which made this book an absolute bestseller in the history of the Russian philosophical thought. The position of its authors,  deeply post-secular,  antiutilitarian and anti-scientistic, and their criticism of the politicized groundless intelligentsia were the main reasons for the retaliation. The trick was a convincing reconstruction of an “average  intellectual’s” consciousness. The Russian intelligentsia gave birth to a lot of prominent cultural figures. But it also gave birth to ambitious people  who considered themselves to be the  salt of the  earth, the stateless apatrides who hate  everything Russian and admire everything  European  or American. The Milestones  authors were among the first in Russia to show that  the fruits of the intelligentsia revolution are non-national, groundless phenomena, in no way connected with Russian foundations and traditions.  The intellectuals’ political consciousness is irreligious and based  on atheism, but it has many similarities with religion and acquires the features of some atheistic pseudo-religion. The Milestones contained sharp and justified criticism directed  at the intransigent party struggle, the love of extremes and the predilection for egalitarianism, that is, those pseudo-religious  qualities of the intelligentsia that  have a pronounced anti-cultural and anti-national orientation.

The  article  discusses   an  important feature  of  Pavel Florensky’s biography and legacy that  has not been properly covered by the existing research.  Florensky is a well-known religious philosopher,  the  author  of The Pillar and  Ground  of the  Truth and lectures  on the philosophy of cult and the philosophy of art. Russian theologists tend to perceive his ideas on a par with Sergei Bulgakov’s sophiology, in line with the modernizing trends  of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which are characterized positively or negatively, depending on the preferences of scholars. The article identifies and comments on some basic facts that testify to Florensky’s desire to preserve intact the dogmata, the canons and the sacraments of the Orthodox  Church. It highlights Florensky’s ideas directed against the concept of progress in the religious consciousness  of mankind and the  associated theory  of “dogmatic development”. The main attention is drawn to Florensky’s position and actions during the upheavals of 1905–1907 and after the February Revolution of 1917. His efforts  to preserve the liturgical and monastic life in the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius and other characteristic moments of his work under the Soviets are detailed. The main conclusion is that,  although Florensky’s works contain  ambiguous concepts and theologoumena, he should still be regarded as a conservative thinker who always had in mind the main goal for which the Orthodox Church existed.

The article analyzes the Eurasianist religious doctrine, the religious views of the leaders of the 1920s Eurasian movement and their relationship with the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church in exile and at home.  Until now, this issue has not been  featured in special papers or monographs. The attention of researchers has been attracted to the political, ideological and other aspects of the Eurasian doctrine. Two of the founders of the Eurasian movement, Georges Florovsky and prince Alexander von Lieven, entered the Church. Florovsky tried to take  the  lead and turn the  movement to purely religious and philosophical development. This shows that, in addition  to  political, anti-colonial, economic  and  geopolitical components, the basis of Eurasianism contains  a strong  religious and  philosophical  element, which is often  underestimated.  The Eurasians unconditionally supported the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Tikhon and condemned the Karlovci schism that led to the emergence of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia. They opposed Catholicism and attempts at proselytism on the part of Catholics who provided assistance to Russian emigrants, pursuing their selfish motives — for example, they offered to teach children, forcing them  to change  religion. Eurasians published  a collection named  Rossiya I Latinstvo (Russia and the Roman Catholic Faith), condemning  the church union, ecumenism  and Catholic theology. After participating in the Eurasian edition of Russia and the Roman Catholic Faith, Florovsky left the movement. To fill the vacant place of a theologian and philosopher, Eurasianists involved Lev Karsavin (Levas Karsavinas), who made his debut in the Evraziyskii Vremennik (Eurasian Chronicle) with the  anti-Catholic article titled  Lessons of the Renounced Faith (1925). Karsavin enriched the Eurasianism with many religious and philosophical ideas, but they came into conflict with the concepts of Nikolai Trubetzkoy. Disputes on “the potential Orthodoxy” and “the  symphonic personality” (Karsavin) or “the choral personality” (Trubetzkoy) were a constant background of Eurasianist discussions and correspondence. The Eurasians opposed  the theological opinions of the archpriest  Sergei Bulgakov, who was suspected of Catholic sympathies, and labeled his sophiology as a theological formalization of Freudianism. In relation to the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, Catholicism and Western confessions in general, as well as to the archpriest Bulgakov’s theological opinions, the Eurasians were of the same mind. The article highlights the differences between the views of the leading Eurasianists on the religion and the Church, outlining the reasons for their confrontation with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside  Russia and  the  loyalty to  the  Russian Orthodox Church persecuted by its homeland.

This article considers Ivan Ilyin’s approach  to the philosophy of religion, Orthodoxy and the Church from the viewpoint of his creative biography. The addition of new materials from the notionalist’s archive, such as memoirs and letters concerning religious issues and the use of the patristic tradition  in the philosophical concept of the thinker, give this review an element  of novelty.  The novelty of the study is also strenghtened by the author’s focus on the question of how the philosopher understood the role and significance of Orthodoxy. The main milestones of the philosopher’s biography are considered from the viewpoint of his works revealing the evolution of his thought. This article highlights the reasons  for Ilyin’s separation from the representatives of the new religious consciousness. Special attention is paid to the philosopher’s connection with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia as well as his participation in Christian circles and meetings.  The emphasis is also laid on the connection between the social and political views of the  notionalist  regarding  the  future  of Russia and Orthodoxy and its importance for the building a healthy statehood. The philosopher’s method and the role of the reason in the process of the knowledge of God are revealed on the example of the philosophy of religion. The Orthodox doctrine had asserted a significant influence on the philosopher’s thinking. Although it is widely accepted that Ivan Ilyin had not yet been a believer during the Moscow period of his creative activity, and instead  approached the worldview issues exclusively from the standpoint of the pure reason, facts can be demonstrated that  suggest the opposite. Inspired by German philosophy, Ivan Ilyin still refused to base his philosophical method on the  Hegelian approach to a man and God, and, in his search, turned instead to the legacy of the Apostolic Fathers through reflections on Socrates.  According to the notionalist, the way to renew the spiritual culture from the state of deep  crisis was to construct a correct religious experience based on humility and integrity of the knowledge.

The article examines  religious and  moral foundations of the  Russian statehood as presented by the  philosopher  and public figure Ivan Solonevich (1891–1953), who, following Vladimir Solovyov, defined his concept as “the dictatorship of conscience”. From Solonevich’s perspective, the specifics of the Russian political tradition consists in its fundamental difference  from European feudalism. In Muscovy, the ruling class was selected according to its moral qualities, and the people’s life was based  on the self-government (“the  people’s  monarchy”). Peter  the  Great ended this tradition by replacing the moral selection criterion with a pragmatic one, which led to the actual destruction of the autocracy and established the dictatorship of the nobility, substituting  the people’s monarchy with European absolutism.  Due to the unity of the tsar and the  people  based  on the  Orthodox faith and the  Orthodox Church as the highest authority in worldly affairs, the Russian monarchy was primarily the people’s power and was never established by violence against  the  people’s  will, while its opponents  always employed  the  violence, i.e. murders,  uprisings and  conspiracies. The foundation of the Russian Orthodox monarchy was the moral feat of the people,  its resignation  for the sake of fulfilling the will of God. This was possible only in Russia, where the founders of the state themselves were saints. Thus, the Moscow Orthodox Tsardom had no problem with the people’s “control” over the government, which was so pressing in Europe, where outright criminals often became monarchs. In Russia, the principle of absolute  trust in the authorities has always been present and has always proven its worth. Only thanks to this trust a small Duchy of Moscow could grow into a great  empire.  As shown  by Ivan Solonevich, the  obvious pragmatic effectiveness of the pre-Petrine people’s monarchy was also ensured by a very effective system of the people’s self-government, unparalleled in feudal absolutist Europe.