This article describes and characterizes European Nazism as an unfinished historical phenomenon. It argues that Nazism will persist as long as the concept of the global West exists. The author points out that Russian society still has not developed a coherent and systematic concept of fascism. From the author’s perspective, Nazism does not represent an “affective” reaction to the culture of modernity, as theorists of the Frankfurt School argued, but rather constitutes the most radical and overt manifestation of modernity itself. According to the author, fascism is the generative ideology of the European modernist enlightenment project. He considers it necessary to reject the myth of Nazism as an allegedly unforeseen historical “breakdown” within Western democracy. A contemporary concept of Nazism must be resilient to liberal narratives and discourses, in order to avoid reproducing false constructs aimed at rehabilitating the core Nazi myths under altered linguistic and stylistic forms. The author emphasizes the need to lift the taboo surrounding the West’s responsibility for fascism and colonialism. This critical reorientation is essential for returning humanity to a Biblical system of values.

The aim of this study is to identify the genesis of antiChristian ideas in German Nazism and to determine their place within the structure of Nazi ideology. The initial hypothesis regarding the existence of an anti-Christian core in the Nazi worldview is verified. The research is based on the methodological principles of discourse analysis and intellectual history, which allow for the reconstruction of key ideological components and the tracing of their origins, transformations, and continuity within the broader context of German social thought.

The study demonstrates that the roots of Nazi anti-Christian sentiment lie in European Romanticism, the neo-pagan myth, the völkisch movement, Wagnerian circles, and Nietzschean anti-theism. A staged strategy of religious transformation is identified: in the first stage, Christianity was merged with paganism; in the second, Christian elements were removed from the newly constructed religious surrogate; in the third, a “pure” Germanic pagan religion was to be established. A likely fourth stage envisioned the replacement of neo-paganism with its esoteric and hermetic core — an openly misanthropic, infernal, and satanic cult.

The research explores the processes of the Nazification of German Christianity, the institutionalization of Germanic neo-paganism, and the development of Nazi esotericism. It emphasizes that responsibility for Nazism lies not only with Hitler and the NSDAP, but with the broader Western civilization that gave rise to them. Neo-paganism, closely linked to neo-Nazism, continues to function as a significant attractor in the historical trajectory of Western thought.

Throughout the twentieth century, the Russian Church was compelled on two occasions to deliver a spiritual and political response to the challenge of German expansionism, Nazism, and fascism — during the First and Second World Wars. These assessments were expressed primarily through ecclesiastical public discourse. During the First World War, such publicistic writings were quite common for the periodical press and were grounded in religious and philosophical thought. In contrast, during the Great Patriotic War, ecclesiastical journalism found itself in a markedly different position. Publicists of the First World War traced the roots of German expansionism above all to German Protestantism, German spiritual ideas, and German philosophy as a whole. They spoke of the rationalistic, mechanical, superficial, and material nature of German culture and civilization, and of Germany’s aspiration to overcome the chaos of the surrounding reality and to restructure the world according to its own vision and mode of thought. The deeply harmful historical dependence of Russian life, culture, and education on German principles and ideas was also emphasized. It was anticipated that Russia’s victory and the overcoming of “Germanism” would bring about the country’s internal revival and renewal. During the Great Patriotic War, however, German philosophy as a whole, as well as materialism and rationalism, could not be subject to open criticism due to the dominance of Marxism in the USSR, which itself had German origins. Ecclesiastical publicists instead focused on the anti-Christian nature of fascism, highlighting the Nazis’ attempts to replace Christ with Hitler and to substitute Christianity with a new paganism, symbolically crowned with the swastika. Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Übermensch (Overman), seen as one of the principal ideological sources of Nazism, came under critical scrutiny. Criticism of Protestantism, once viewed as the environment that fostered German expansionism, was largely absent, owing to the allied relations with the United States and Great Britain. As a counterpoint to Nazism, ecclesiastical publications offered an idealized image of the Soviet social system as an example of overcoming anti-Christian national and class divisions, and of establishing universal humanistic equality. However, given the profound transformation in worldview that has occurred since the Second World War, this ideal is no longer viable in the present day. It is therefore necessary to analyze the Church’s polemic with German expansionism, Nazism, and fascism in the twentieth century and to propose new ideas and a new antifascist societal ideal.

This article offers reflections on A.V.   Shchipkov’s book Unfinished Nazism: Genesis, Transformations, and Related Phenomena. In it, the author proposes a quite paradoxical thesis, identifying liberalism as the ideological “root” of contemporary Nazism. Previously, drawing connections between   liberalism and fascism was an intellectual move typically confined to leftist academic circles. However, the author emphasizes that this particular interpretation of the connection between fascism and liberalism is both original and independent in its own right. As a necessary condition for the discussion, he emphasizes the need to recognize liberalism as an external ideological “protective belt” that shields and legitimizes Nazi doctrines. A serious conceptual framework for understanding modern Nazism, therefore, must be immune to the liberal–neo-Nazi perspective and must exclude any liberal constructs at its very foundation. This methodological distancing enables the author to challenge the most widespread clichés about Nazism. For instance, that it emerged in Europe unpredictably and by accident, as an anomalous exception within Western civilization. In his book, Shchipkov argues instead that Nazism did not arise as a historical reaction to Marxism or communism, but much earlier, as a racist, political-ideological form inherent in the colonial model of capitalism. According to this view, Nazism is not a historical aberration or a systemic failure of society, but a natural product of Western modernity. The imperial and expansionist pathos of fascism, in this light, can be traced back to Europe’s colonial conquests that began in the late 15th century, culminating in the famous notion of the “white man’s burden”. Thus, racism, Nazism, and liberalism share a common value system, one based on the division of the world and the hierarchical classification of “human material”. One of the key points in the book is that the historical kinship between fascism and liberalism — i.e., the European complex of civilizational superiority — ultimately has religious roots, which lie in Protestantism and the Reformation. (This, however, does not imply that individuals with Protestant beliefs and (or) worldviews are inherently inclined toward Nazism or racism). Shchipkov’s attempt to “theoretically complete” the concept of Nazism comes at a time when this sinister phenomenon is not only re-emerging before our eyes but is also receiving comprehensive support from the liberal West. The “battleground” today includes the mental and ideological sphere, where a struggle is underway for the minds and souls of our people. For this reason, Shchipkov’s book also serves an applied purpose: it contributes to the development of a counter-ideology.

In the modern world, Nazism, now in the form of NeoNazism, is raising its head again. The primary goal of Neo-Nazism and their supporters is to change the worldview of the Russian people and to physically destroy Russian civilization and Orthodoxy. Information and telecommunications technologies are used to propagate Nazi ideology, attract new adherents, and commit crimes that are intrinsic to its essence. In light of the absence of an official universal definition of Nazism, the article examines proposed lists of phenomena that constitute its essence, as suggested by researchers. One of the ways to counter contemporary Neo-Nazism is through criminal liability for actions related to its rehabilitation, for offending the religious feelings of believers, and for inciting national, religious, and other forms of hatred or enmity. The author provides statistics on these crimes, highlights the peculiarities of committing them using the information and telecommunications network Internet and presents several examples of criminal cases. Neo-Nazism is accompanied by Neo-Paganism and separatist ideas, which are disseminated using information technologies and pose a clear threat to the Russian statehood. Finally, the article proposes methods to counter the spread of Nazi ideology through information and telecommunications technologies. The basis of the article is the theses from the author’s speech at the forum for the protection of traditional values named after Tatyana Shchipkova “The Russian World Against Nazism”, held in Smolensk on September 25, 2024.

This article examines issues of language policy in the context of the global dominance of the English language. The aggressive spread of English was historically rooted in the racial policies of Britain and the United States, beginning in the 18th century. Over the past two centuries, the international expansion of English, pursued by the political leadership of these nations, has led to linguistic discrimination against other peoples and cultures. The origins of this policy lie in an ideology based on racial segregation and the belief in the superiority of one race over all others. By analogy, the dominance of English as a global means of communication has resulted in the suppression or destruction of national languages. This phenomenon can be described as linguistic Nazism. As the United States expanded its zones of influence, it imposed English as the dominant language among colonized populations. English became a tool of colonial policy and the standard in education systems. The article also explores the methods developed for teaching English to immigrants beginning in the 19th century. Methods that became foundational for the global dissemination of the language. A key role in this process was played by the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), the largest Protestant missionary organization of the time. The YMCA developed an English language teaching method for immigrants that was based on a restrictive approach that erased essential concepts such as native-language knowledge and national culture. In Russia, the teaching of foreign languages since the 1990s has been based on Anglo-American methods that introduced Protestant educational principles based on the rejection of one’s native language and culture. This aggressive imposition of Western standards in language instruction has led to the impoverishment of the Russian language and, in many cases, to the erosion of traditional values among students.

This article explores the heroic legacy of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War as an object of historical memory, and examines the contemporary actions of the Russian people framed as a continuation of the Russian people’s legacy of heroism, now expressed through the ongoing Special Military Operation (SMO). The 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War prompts renewed attention to the legitimacy of this continuity, which holds significant meaning for public life in Russia. Contemporary public narratives — particularly those invoking historical memory — often draw a direct line between the heroism of the Soviet and Russian peoples in their struggle against a persistent enemy: a nationalist ideology grounded in opposition to Russia and its people.

The article analyzes various ways in which this continuity of heroism is constructed, including ideological similarities between enemies past and present; the participation of our country’s multiethnic population in combat; humanitarian efforts on the home front; the reorientation of industry toward military needs; and the self-sacrifice of soldiers. These parallels, rooted in the Russian nation’s historical memory, raise the question of whether the heroism of the Soviet and Russian peoples can be regarded as equivalent.

Special attention is given to the role of specific phenomena, ideas, and symbols that maintain a strong connection with the historical memory of the people. The article emphasizes the importance of incorporating these historical symbols into educational and civic initiatives.

Special emphasis is placed on the direct parallels in the way Russia was portrayed in the ideology of its adversaries then, during the Great Patriotic War, and now, in the context of the Special Military Operation.

The article concludes with recommendations for improving domestic educational and public outreach efforts related to the Special Military Operation and offers proposals for commemorating the new heroes of the Russian homeland.

The American ideological model is based on messianic ideas about the exceptionality of the United States as a country and people who have created a better social order and are bringing it to the world. These ideas are a modern form of transformation of the inherently nazi ideas about the superiority of the american nation over other nations. The practical application of the ideas of superiority is ensured through censorship mechanisms. The key concept of american ideology is the concept of freedom, the United States has secured the right to interpret it, which gave them the exclusive right to censor around the world. The First Amendment on freedom of speech acts as both a “sacred text” and a legal source of the US right to censorship. American political censorship has taken many forms throughout its history, from crowd censorship, hidden legislative censorship, and party censorship to modern corporate censorship. Modern American censorship defends the inherently nazi idea of american exceptionalism and superiority.

This article examines the question of how fascism was collectively perceived within circles of the Russian conservative émigré community. The author identifies a segment of this milieu as a group of individuals who sincerely considered themselves Russian patriots, yet failed to grasp the origins and underlying meaning of German National Socialism — an ideology originally aimed at erasing the unified Russian identity from history. The discussion focuses on Russian conservatives in exile, such as Ivan Ilyin, Ivan Shmelyov, Piotr Donskov, and others. The article explores the inadequacy of certain émigré interpretations of German fascism, arguing that the primary distorting factor in the perception of fascism by this segment of the Russian émigré community was the mythologization of post-Christian Europeanism. This includes a Russian faith in the West as a “land of sacred miracles” and the magical image of “Europe’s ancient stones”. Similar concepts became objects of veneration even among patriotic conservatives. Since reflection on the foundations of knowledge is typically suppressed by mechanisms of culture and collective psychology, European fascism as a phenomenon inevitably escaped moral scrutiny within this émigré circle, despite its members’ Christian convictions. The author also contends that fascism was not a “reaction to communism”, as later claimed by German revanchist historians, but rather a reaction to the broader crisis of historical modernity, regardless of the specific ideological forms that crisis took in the 20th century. According to the article’s logic, fascism should be understood as a far more expansive historical phenomenon than Hitlerism alone. Its roots in the culture of the modern age granted fascism greater historical longevity compared to communism, while also establishing a historical succession that links Pan-Germanism, Hitlerism, and Atlanticism. The article emphasizes that a genuine understanding of the nature of fascism is impossible without accounting for the full trajectory of European modern thought.